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Abstract 
 
The presidential-parliamentary distinction is foundational to comparative politics and at the 
center of a large theoretical and empirical literature.  However, an examination of constitutional 
texts suggests a fair degree of heterogeneity within these categories with respect to important 
institutional attributes.  These observations lead us to suspect that the classic presidential-
parliamentary distinction, as well as the semi-presidential category, is not a systemic one.  This 
paper investigates whether the defining attributes that separate presidential and parliamentary 
constitutions predict other attributes that are stereotypically associated with these institutional 
models. The results lead us to be highly skeptical of the “systemic” nature of the classification.  
Indeed, the results imply that if one wanted to predict the powers of the executive and legislature, 
one would be better off knowing where and when the constitution was written than in knowing 
whether it was presidential or parliamentary.   
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The conceptualization of the relationship between executives and legislatures (henceforth 
“forms” or “systems” of government) is central to scholarship on comparative politics, and no 
categorization is more influential than the tri-partite distinction between presidentialism, 
parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism. This classification has so thoroughly dominated 
scholars’ understanding of executive-legislative relations that it has almost no conceptual 
competition.  In this paper, we examine the constitutions that populate these categories and 
evaluate the degree to which this time-honored conceptualization captures variance in executive-
legislative relations.  That is, does the classification allow one to predict the various powers and 
responsibilities of executives and legislatures, many of which are presumed to follow from 
presidentialism and parliamentarism?  We have reason to be skeptical, as we explain below. 
Most traditional (so-called “classic”) approaches to categorization require that the objects 
under study share a set of finite definitional (necessary or sufficient) properties.  More recent 
approaches to classification such as the well-known prototype (Rosch) and family resemblance 
(Witgenstein) models operate under a more probabilistic assumption in which similarly classified 
cases are those that share a large number of non-necessary attributes.1  However, even those 
operating in a classical approach expect some family resemblance: that is, that similarly 
classified objects will resemble one another with respect to a collection of other, elective, 
attributes.  It can be distressing to a taxonomer to find significant variation within a given 
category with respect to elective features, many of which may also be shared across categories. 
When biologists categorized the platypus as a mammal rather than a reptile, for example, they 
relied on definitional characteristics (lactation) over non-definitional ones (laying eggs, a duck-
bill) to make their determination, and thereby emphasized similarities with beavers over lizards 
or ducks.  In the context of a widely-shared taxonomy among scientists and students, 
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classification decisions serve to reinforce perceptions of the similarity and dissimilarity of 
organisms.  Organisms are assumed to share more characteristics with co-classified than they do 
with cross-classified organisms.  In the field of comparative politics, scholars rely on an 
assumption that the presidential-parliamentary distinction (defined in various ways) classifies 
constitutions that are reasonably homogenous across a range of attributes of executive-legislative 
relations.  For many scholars, knowing that, say, Australia is “parliamentary” would seem to 
summarize much of what they would want to know about the powers and responsibilities of the 
Australian parliament, and what makes it distinct from, say, the United States Congress.   
Beyond its presumptive descriptive power, the distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary systems (henceforth the “classical” approach to the classification of executive-
legislative relations) is also hypothesized to exert significant explanatory power over a wide 
range of outcomes.  An incomplete list of such outcomes includes the survival of democracy, 
economic policy, budget deficits, economic performance, social cleavage management, ethnic 
conflict, international peace, international cooperation, the quality of democracy, party systems, 
human development, and accountability.2 The classical classification also has an influence on 
real world constitutional design. In recent years, the choice of presidentialism or parliamentarism 
– as debated in such terms – has occupied a good deal of constitution-makers’ attention in 
countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Brazil, Kenya, and Russia.  In short, this is another case of 
the very close link between classification and explanation.3  
We examine the proposition that the classical conceptualization entails a set of systemic 
properties.  If the variation in aspects of executive-legislative relations spans dimensions that do 
not correlate with the classical distinction, it would behoove us to develop alternative concepts, 
or at least multi-dimensional ones.  The first step, however, is to evaluate the coherence and 
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predictability of the classical typology.  A growing literature, including what we might term the  
“varieties of presidentialism” genre associated with Shugart and Carey,4 suggests significant 
heterogeneity within at least one of the types.  New data that we introduce below allow us to 
inspect the institutional configuration of various executive-legislative arrangements, historical 
and contemporary, both within and across types.  We look closely at design choices for each of 
six features of the constitutional allocation of powers and authority between the executive and 
the legislature – features thought to be associated with one or the other system.  From a universe 
of 826 national constitutions written between 1789 and 2006, we evaluate a sample of 401 
constitutions considered to be presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential.  We explore 
whether these labels in fact capture homogenous institutional configurations by examining the 
similarity of constitutions within and across categories.  We find an extraordinary amount of 
within-type heterogeneity across the attributes in question.  Indeed, knowing whether a 
constitution is parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a 
constitution’s executive-legislative structure (across these features, at least) than is knowing the 
geographic region in which the constitution was produced, or when it was written.   
Although within-type cohesion is low (at least by our expectations) for all three 
categories, we find measureable differences in the degree of cohesion across types, with 
parliamentary constitutions standing out as the least cohesive of the three.  Ironically, we find 
that semi-presidentialism – despite its seemingly hybrid nature -- is more internally coherent than 
the other categories, and that semi-presidential constitutions are equally similar to parliamentary 
and presidential ones. The results of the measurement exercise lead us to offer some guidance 
about the use of the classical typology and imply a research agenda for further conceptual 
exploration.   
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I. THE CLASSICAL TAXONOMY AND ITS BOUNDARIES 
A telling entrée into the challenges of conceptualizing executive-legislative relations is 
the troubled concept of “semi-presidentialism,” a species of constitutions that now outnumbers 
pure presidentialism by some counts.5  The category has defied easy (or at least a consensual) 
definition since Duverger first described and labeled it.6  After reviewing the definitional debate, 
Elgie has argued forcefully that the particular powers of president and prime minister should be 
excluded from the definition, and thus defines semi-presidentialism as a system “where a 
popularly-elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are 
responsible to parliament.”7  This definition has an elegant simplicity and seems to resonate with 
current usage.  It focuses on the formal provisions of the constitution and thus eliminates many 
(though not all) ambiguous cases associated with other definitions.  It also focuses on the critical 
question of the source of executive responsibility rather than the relationship among executives, 
or even the total scope of executive power or independence.   
One oft-voiced critique of Elgie’s definition (and Duverger’s formulation before it) is that 
the semi-presidential category includes a wide range of disparate systems.8  The sense is that the 
class is internally incoherent, at least as compared with the supposedly purer types of presidential 
and parliamentary systems.  Elgie responds to this objection by pointing out that the categories of 
presidentialism and parliamentarism, accepted by most comparativists as foundational, 
themselves mask great internal variation.9  A more damning critique of “semi-presidentialism” is 
that one or more of the features that distinguish the category (e.g., direct elections for a fixed 
term president) may not matter,10 perhaps because they do not predict other institutional traits.  
This issue of institutional coherence within the classical categories is subject to empirical 
verification and helps to motivate our paper.  
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In fact, a growing number of scholars has come to emphasize the diversity within the 
“purebreds” as well.  Some of these contributions have, naturally, come in the wake of Juan 
Linz’11 widely discussed claims about the perils of presidentialism for democratic survival – 
claims that led scholars to dig more deeply into the meaning of the subtypes.  So, in their 
groundbreaking study, Shugart and Carey show that Presidents actually wield a wider range of 
powers than generally assumed.12  For example, some presidents have full control of the hiring 
and firing of the cabinet, some do not; some have significant lawmaking powers (whether 
proactive or reactive), some do not.13  Similarly, another set of scholars has emphasized the 
diversity, which some see as growing, within parliamentary systems.  An example is the careful 
study by Poguntke and Webb on the “presidentialization” of governments, in which the authors 
(and most of their contributors) suggest that parliamentary governments in stable democracies 
have increasingly taken on stereotypically “presidential” characteristics with respect to power 
resources, autonomy, and the degree of personalization.  Importantly, Poguntke and Webb’s 
dimension of partified versus presidentialized government is one that is orthogonal – 
theoretically and empirically -- to the classic typology: all three types exhibit significant 
variation along this dimension.14  This orthogonal quality is worth emphasizing, lest one 
conclude that the dimension measures degrees of the category of “presidentialism,” which would 
only reinforce the relevance of the classic dimension.  Finally, Tsebelis’ focus on veto players 
suggests another source of skepticism about the classic categories.15  Tsebelis’ conceptualization 
is intended to depart from the “institutional debates conducted in pairs” (with presidentialism and 
parliamentarism representing only one such pair) in favor of a dimension that cuts through these 
classic lines of demarcation.16  Taken together, these three studies – Shugart and Carey, 
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Poguntke and Webb, and Tsebelis – leave one to wonder about how exhaustively the classic 
categorization maps the contrast space in executive-legislative relations.     
We posit that the classical typology implies a set of core defining attributes as well as a 
set of elective, incidental, attributes.  The research question turns on how elective, exactly, the 
third set of attributes is.  The defining distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism 
concerns the degree of dependence of the executive on the legislature, specifically with respect 
to the selection and dismissal procedures of the executive. Consider a representative formulation: 
“Parliamentarism is understood as a system of government in which the executive is chosen by, 
and responsible to, an elective body (the legislature), thus creating a single locus of sovereignty 
at the national level.”17  By contrast, Presidents -- in Shugart and Carey’s terms – are 
distinguished by their separation from the legislature with respect to their “origin” (they are 
selected by direct elections) and “survival” (they serve fixed terms).   
Presidentialism and parliamentarism are also considered to be systems of governance and, 
in this sense, contain a number of less fundamental but nonetheless important features that are 
supposed to hang together.18 As Moe and Caldwell put it, "when nations choose a presidential or 
parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system whose various properties arise 
endogenously – whether they like it or not -- out of the political dynamics that their adopted form 
sets in motion… Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their own baggage. They are 
package deals."19 
It is in part because of these presumably elective properties that broad characterizations 
of these systems are possible and cross-system performance varies.  Thus, to cite only one 
example, according to Tsebelis, “[i]n parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls 
the agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential 
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systems the legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs or vetoes 
them.”20 This more encompassing understanding of parliamentarism and presidentialism very 
likely derives in part from the makeup of prototypical cases such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, with the expectation that other cases in the class exhibit some family resemblance.  
The “semi-presidentialist” constitutions that have never quite fit represent either a discrete family 
or an intermediate “bastard” tribe.21 
One distinguishing elective characteristic is that, as the Tsebelis remark above suggests, 
governments in parliamentary systems maintain tight control of the legislative agenda, which 
perhaps follows from the idea that a loss on an important vote may imply their demise.  Since 
governments in presidential systems do not risk removal from power in the middle of their term, 
they can afford to relinquish agenda-setting powers to the legislature.  The Tsebelis 
characterization (and conventional wisdom) also suggests that veto power – the mechanism that 
allows presidents to react to the proposals initiated in the legislature – is typical of presidential 
constitutions. Veto power is so closely associated with presidentialism that Shugart and Carey 
even go so far as to incorporate it as a defining attribute.22 
On the other hand, parliamentary constitutions grant the head of state little or no power to 
block legislation.23 Historically, these powers had been granted to monarchs; as they evolved 
into figure-heads of state and formal constitutions were adjusted to reflect this fact, veto powers 
in parliamentary systems tended to fall into oblivion, to use von Beyme’s phrase.24 
Similarly, stylized accounts of presidentialism and parliamentarism suggest that 
presidents wield unilateral control of the appointment and removal of cabinet members, while 
such power is left to the assembly in parliamentary government (subject to a ratification by a 
figure-head of state).  Part of the theory here is that the prime minister, as merely primus inter 
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pares, should not be vested with broad hierarchical power to organize the cabinet (which would 
amount to a constrained choice, anyway, since the candidate list would be a subset of her peers 
in the legislature).  Semi-presidentialist constitutions – true to their nature – occupy a middle 
ground in this respect: in some cases the appointment and dismissal of the cabinet is the 
responsibility of the president, in others it is that of the assembly, and still others the 
responsibility is shared.25  It is indeed due to this ambiguity that many believe semi-presidential 
constitutions are problematic.26   Presidential control over the ministry is explicitly associated 
with presidentialism in many accounts and Shugart and Carey even elevate cabinet selection to a 
definitional attribute.27  Muller, Bergman, and Strom consider the idea of including cabinet-
selection-by-the-legislature as a defining attribute of parliamentarism and ultimately decide 
against doing so, reasoning – in part -- that actual practice among presumably “parliamentary” 
systems exhibits substantial diversity with respect to this trait.28 
Regarding the important matter of the legislature’s oversight of the executive, it can be 
argued that it should be considered to be primarily part of the system of checks and balances that 
is often embedded in separation-of-powers constitutions.  Parliamentary constitutions, in turn, 
are structured in such a way as to maximize the convergence between the interests of the 
government and those of the legislative majority; consequently, provisions for legislative 
oversight of the executive would be redundant in these constitutions.29  In semi-presidential 
constitutions, oversight is only required to the extent the executive is independent (as in 
contemporary Taiwan, for example, where the appointment of the prime minister is not subject to 
parliamentary approval).  However, it is certainly the case that many parliamentary systems have 
a rigorous and visible practice of interpellation (think “question time” in the British House of 
Commons).  Indeed, Muller, Bergman, and Strom list legislative control of the executive, 
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through means such as interpellation and “committees of inquiry,” as a hallmark of 
parliamentarism.30 
We finally come to the complex issues of emergency and decree powers. Emergency and 
executive decree powers are intimately connected since the latter evolved and became formalized 
out of the practice of the former. It was the declaration and maintenance of a state of siege or the 
passing of full power laws by both warring and neutral powers during World War I that led to, as 
Agamben puts it, “the extension of the executive’s powers into the legislative sphere through the 
issuance of decrees and measures.”31 While emergency powers are more typically associated 
with presidential constitutions, decree powers – in particular the scope of the permissible 
delegation of authority by parliament32 – has been more easily justified in the context of 
parliamentary regimes, even though it has been a concern in constitutions representing all regime 
types – parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential.  The oft-heard refrain is that in 
parliamentary systems decree power is needed in order to create a more muscular executive. 
Thus, emergency powers, which allow the executive to suspend the constitution for a 
specific period of time when unusual circumstances occur, are commonly associated with 
presidential constitutions. Ferejohn and Pasquino argue that constitutional systems based on 
parliamentary sovereignty reject the “dualistic” regime that emergency provisions establish, that 
is, the notion that there exists a regular and an exceptional government. In these systems, they 
say, "if there is a need to suspend rights or consolidate powers to deal with an emergency, all this 
can be managed efficiently by the sovereign body itself -- normally the legislature (like in the 
British parliamentary system).”33  Loveman, in turn, argues that the uniquely strong emergency 
provisions of the 19th century presidential constitutions of Latin America were at the root of the 
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region’s political instability and militarization of politics (a charge sometimes repeated with 
regard to Weimar semi-presidentialism).34 
Executive decree powers, in turn, were justified in the European democracies of the inter-
war period by the argument that the transfer of legislative authority to the executive did not 
imply abdication since parliament retained the power to withdraw confidence from the 
government and remove it from office. In this sense, decree power was seen as merely an issue 
of legal technique, changing parliamentary practice from ex ante to ex post approval of 
government action.35 It is precisely because this justification cannot be extended to presidential 
constitutions that concerns with abuse of decree powers by presidents is so heightened in new 
democracies: granting legislative authority to the executive in a system of separation of powers 
implies abdication since the legislature has no ex post mechanisms for controlling the actions 
taken by decree.36  
The ancillary institutions that are said to characterize the three types of constitutions 
sometimes play central roles in causal theory on the effects of the types..  In fact, many accounts 
of cross-system variation in important outcomes are focused on the presence or absence of these 
very attributes. Thus, the tight control of the legislative agenda by the government in 
parliamentary systems and the head of state’s veto in presidential systems are presumed to be at 
the root of their differences with respect to the probability of shifts in policy from the status quo. 
The former attribute prevents the “separation of purpose” between the executive and the 
legislature in parliamentary systems, thus reducing the likelihood that partisan veto players will 
emerge; the latter ensures that presidential systems will always have at least one more 
institutional veto player than do parliamentary ones.37 As noted above, emergency powers 
thought to be disproportionally present in presidential constitutions are said to have been at the 
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root of the instability of Latin American countries since the 19th century. Linz lists the control of 
cabinets as one among several of the “perils of presidentialism.” Finally, concern about the 
dangers posed by constitutional decree powers has been almost exclusively focused on 
presidential systems, with much of this concern revolving around the notion that such powers 
lead to usurpation of legislative powers by the executive, with important consequences for 
democracy and policy. 
Thus, a number of modular properties are thought to cohere in presidential and 
parliamentary constitutions, and are thought to account for differences in the performance of the 
systems that adopt such constitutions. We are aware that some of these properties are less widely 
associated with one specific type of constitution and that some stereotypes may be rooted in non-
constitutional elements. This is particularly true of executive decree powers and of legislative 
oversight. The latter is a function that is often achieved via non-constitutional means38 and one 
that, some may argue, is unrelated to presidentialism and parliamentarism.  The prevalence of 
these stereotypes is, of course, an empirical question in its own right.  But no matter how widely 
held these stereotypes, they are all central components of the relationship between executives 
and legislatures and ones that would be plausibly associated with its dominant conceptualization. 
In our view, the question of whether or not these attributes cluster in predictable poles is 
important in and of itself.. After all, if these attributes are equally distributed across regime 
types, political scientists will need to come to grips with a world with more dimensions and 
contours than they imagined – dimensions that require rethinking concepts and causal theory. 
We summarize these expectations in Table 1.  Briefly, parliamentary constitutions should 
provide for strong executive control of the legislative agenda and weak executive veto, relatively 
strong executive decree powers, relatively weak emergency provisions, relatively weak 
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involvement of the head of state in government formation and removal, and relatively 
undeveloped oversight instruments.  Presidential constitutions should be characterized by weak 
executive control of the legislative agenda, strong veto powers, relatively weak decree powers, 
strong emergency provisions, control of government formation and removal by the president, and 
relatively well developed oversight provisions.  Finally, semi-presidential constitutions, which 
occupy an intermediate category, presumably labor under fewer stereotypes except – perhaps – 
with respect to their characteristically strong emergency provisions.  One also wonders about the 
relative cohesion of  “semi-“ regimes.  That is, do these cases exhibit enough consistency in their 
design that we should think of them as more than just intermediate cases, or hybrids?  
Homogeneity of design would suggest a regime type of its own, not simply a mongrel occupant 
of a residual category. 
Table 1 about here 
 
II. SOME EMPIRICAL REFERENCE POINTS 
In spite of the theoretical coherence of parliamentary and presidential constitutions, 
almost any real-world episode of constitutional design seems to raise doubts about the utility of 
these categories in predicting ancillary institutional attributes. Consider four constitutional 
experiences drawn from diverse locales: 
Afghanistan.  In 2003, the Constitutional Drafting Commission of Afghanistan sent its 
final draft to the President’s office, after which it was to be forwarded to the Constitutional Loya 
Jirga for passage.  The draft had been painstakingly constructed, with support from the United 
Nations and others, and featured a parliamentary system, which many believed was the best 
model to ensure representation for Afghanistan’s diverse population.  When the draft emerged 
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from the President’s office, however, the system had been changed to a presidential one.  But the 
constitution retained, whether intentionally or not, the ability for the parliament to vote no 
confidence in government ministers based on “well-founded reasons” (though the text did not 
clearly spell out the implications of such a vote).39   
Ukraine.  In the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, constitutional amendments adopted 
overnight (and in violation of constitutional norms) sought to engineer a compromise with the 
Kuchma regime by recalibrating the powers of president and parliament.40 This led to various 
instabilities and the creation of a “parliamentary oligarchy,” as well as a new round of proposals 
to restructure the political system.  Later proposals sought to extend presidential power, allowing 
the executive to dissolve parliament and appoint the prime minister if the parliament rejects the 
proposed candidate.  Tensions over the allocation of powers, however, led the government to fall 
in September 2008.  In October 2010, the Ukrainian constitutional court abruptly handed 
parliamentary powers of government formation and dismissal back to the President, a 
development that is still unfolding as of this writing.  Ukraine seems to be a system swinging 
between extremes in an effort to find a workable semi-presidential model. 
Australia.  In 1975, the Australian Governor General utilized, for the first time and 
against constitutional convention, his formal power to dismiss the Prime Minister after the 
government had lost the confidence of the upper house of parliament and failed to secure passage 
of the budget.  Given that the government enjoyed the confidence of the lower house, this was 
viewed by many as a violation of the norm in parliamentary systems.  The debate over the 
constitutionality of the action led one political scientist to characterize the Australian system as 
the “Washminster” system, that could neither be seen as a variant of Westminster nor as a pure 
presidential system.41 
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Brazil.  A memorable photograph from the 1987–88 Brazilian constitutional assembly 
shows a group of presidentialistas celebrating their come-from-behind victory in a highly 
contested roll call vote on the simple question of presidentialism or parliamentarism.  Until that 
critical juncture, many of the delegates had operated under the assumption that parliamentarism, 
not presidentialism, would be the governing structure of the new system.  Thus, in constructing 
much of the constitutional structure, delegates operated with not only an unclear sense of the 
basic relationship between powers, but also, most probably, with a fundamentally distorted sense 
of such.  The 1988 Constitution has certainly induced a pattern of politics that is closer to what 
we observe in many parliamentary countries than what unfolded, for instance, under the 1946 
Constitution.  Few people would contest the fact that under the 1988 Brazilian constitution the 
president possesses powers that are often found in parliamentary systems, such as: control of the 
legislative agenda, including the monopoly of some initiatives; the ability to request urgent 
consideration of specific legislation; and, of course, decree powers. At the same time, legislators 
face an incentive structure that does not really distinguish them from their counterparts in the 
prototypical parliamentary systems, who are appropriately referred to as back-benchers (or “low-
clergy” in Brazil).  It has been argued that it is the presence of such powers that allows for 
legislative outcomes in Brazil that are similar to the ones obtained in parliamentary 
systems.42 The result is a political structure that has defied all odds, at least the ones that were 
dominant in the first years of operation of the 1988 document.43 
In each of these cases, category confusion played some role in constitutional design.  In 
each, the founders had either by design or omission failed to spell out key aspects of legislative-
executive relations, or left untouched arrangements that were meant for a different “system.” 
And in each, the lacuna led to constitutional crisis—or at least misunderstanding.  The Brazilian 
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and Afghan cases are usually classified as presidential systems; the Australian is typically 
considered parliamentary; and the Ukraine is considered semi-presidential.  Yet in each, disputes 
have emerged between head of state and parliament and confusion remains about the scope of 
their respective powers. In short, the categories used by political scientists have been adopted by 
constitutional designers, but frequently the actual provisions of texts seem to deviate from the 
pure types, sometimes leading to constitutional confusion. 
III. ANALYSIS 
How internally cohesive are the classical categories?  Our basic research strategy is to 
analyze whether constitutions that fall into one of the three classes are in fact more similar to one 
another with regard to key institutional attributes than they are to constitutions outside their 
class.   
Our method is to compare constitutions, contemporary and historical, with respect to their 
division of power between the executive and legislature.  Our data are from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project (CCP), a comprehensive inventory of the provisions of written 
Constitutions for all independent states between 1789 and 2012.44  Collection of the data is 
ongoing and for purposes of this article the dataset includes 632 systems, from the 826 
constitutional systems identified by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton.45  Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton include a large number of questions in their survey instrument, many of which have to do 
with the powers of the executive and the legislature.  
At the outset, we should make clear that our analysis is restricted to formal provisions in 
written constitutional texts (we will refer to this as de jure constitutionalism).  Actual political 
practice in any country with regard to executive-legislative relations is certainly more 
complicated than what is written into formal constitutional rules, and likely reflects informal 
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conventions as well as other sources of law such as judicial opinions. Nevertheless, there are 
good reasons to focus on written texts. For one, formal constitutional rules make for a roughly 
comparable set of data to examine across time and space.  By contrast, examining unwritten 
constitutional rules raises significant problems of identification that are likely insurmountable 
except in small samples.  Second, formal texts reflect discrete acts of constitutional designers, 
many of whom are informed by the classical typology.  In this sense, we can tie our analysis of 
institutional design to an identifiable activity and mode of behavior – constitution-making – and 
thereby keep the process in sight.  Importantly, we know who did what and when.  Our analysis, 
then, can be seen as examining whether the provisions chosen by constitution-makers produce 
coherent systems that reflect the classical typology. We recognize though that the 
implementation of these decisions may depart from written law. 
We proceed in three broad stages.  First, we utilize a set of variables from the CCP to 
develop a tripartite categorization of government type based on the explicit provision of the 
attributes that define these categories.  We then consider each of six “elective” attributes 
individually and assess their association with one or the other government types.  We next 
develop a measure of institutional similarity between pairs of constitutions, based on items 
representing these six attributes, and assess institutional coherence in a multivariate regression 
model that specifies other sources of similarity, notably regional and temporal proximity.  
A. The Operationalization of Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Semi-Presidentialism 
Despite the centrality of the classical conceptualization, scholars have not settled on a 
standard classification scheme and no one has apparently even attempted to do so for 
constitutions in force prior to 1945.  There are at least four published classifications of countries 
for the post-war era.46  We choose to construct the classical classification from the CCP dataset, 
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which has distinct advantages since its unit of analysis (the constitutional system), its sample, 
and its focus on de jure institutions provides consistency across the left- and right-hand sides of 
the equation. We then evaluate the measure’s validity against the alternative set of measures that 
are available for the subset of cases that match.  
Our measure of the classical categorization scheme hinges on its defining feature – 
whether or not the government is collectively dependent upon the legislature for survival.  This 
feature, as we describe above, is the crux of the distinction between presidentialism and 
parliamentarism.47  If a government can be removed by the legislature for political reasons (that 
is, removal is not restricted to criminal or behavioral misconduct), the case is coded 
parliamentary (n=119); 48 if not, it is coded presidential so long as the head of state is popularly 
elected, either directly or indirectly (n=204). Semi-presidential systems (n=78) are those in 
which the government can be removed by the legislature and there is a popularly elected head of 
state.  A large set of excluded cases (n=230) contains those constitutions whose provisions do 
not formally define these powers, such as constitutional monarchies in which assembly 
confidence in the government is not explicit (e.g. Netherlands 1848, Norway 1814, and Canada 
1867) or seemingly presidential systems in which the president is not popularly elected (e.g., 
Brazil’s 1937 constitution).49  A plot of the population within each class across time (Figure 1) 
provides a better sense of the universe of cases and documents the well-known increase in the 
number of semi-presidential systems in recent decades. 
Figure 1 about here 
How does this classification match those produced by other scholars?  And, for that 
matter, how do these other measures match each other?  As one rough indication, we calculate 
the percentage of cases (constitutional systems) for which any two classifications agree.  For the 
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four comparisons with our measure, this quantity ranges from 46% (compared with Beck et al.) 
to 89% (with Cheibub) with a mean across the four comparisons of 60%.  Overall, Cheibub’s 
measure (which was produced for another theoretical purpose unrelated to the present inquiry) 
exhibits the highest degree of intercorrelation, with mean matching scores of 85% and 84% 
respectively while the Beck et al and Norris measures exhibit scores significantly below our own 
of 54% and 61%.50 One inference from these numbers is that scholars’ understanding of 
presidentialism and parliamentarism may not be as consensual as one would expect.  In fact, a 
major source of divergence has to do with how the scholars decide to treat intermediate cases.  
Beck et al, for example, appear to push cases towards one of the pure types (presidentialism or 
parliamentarism) and to avoid a designation of semi-presidentialism.   
It is instructive to compare more closely our classification with the Cheibub measure, 
which exhibits the highest correspondence across datasets and therefore may be the closest thing 
to a standard measure in the field.  Cheibub’s classification is available for a smaller set of cases 
(democratic constitutions since 1945) than that derived from the CCP, whose sample includes all 
written constitutions since 1789.  For the 129 constitutions over which the two measures overlap, 
117 fall into the same category, suggesting substantial similarity between the two measurement 
approaches.  Not surprisingly, the difference between the classifications stems from the treatment 
of the intermediate category.  Nine of the twelve cases along which the measures disagree are 
ones that we have coded as semi-presidential and Cheibub has coded as either presidential (4) or 
parliamentary (5).   
B. How elective are the elective attributes? 
Do we observe coherence in the distribution of the ancillary properties listed in Table 1?  
Table 2 calculates the proportion of constitutions with each of these properties across all 
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constitutions as well as for those constitutions written before and after World War II. We should 
note that these proportions necessarily mask a fair degree of variation.  Certainly, powers can be 
qualified and restricted in a number of important ways.  In other analyses (not shown), we 
construct a more nuanced measure of these powers; we also evaluate a broader set of powers, 
such as amendment proposal, budgetary powers, war powers, and immunity provisions for either 
branch.  Substantively, these latter approaches deliver roughly equivalent results and so we focus 
here on the core set of six powers, in their aggregate form.  The list of cases before World War II 
is limited due not only to our more limited sample prior to that time, but also because of the 
relative silence in early parliamentary constitutions with respect to executive-legislative 
relations. Because parliamentarism emerged as an evolutionary process characterized by a 
“gradual devolution of power from monarchs to parliaments”,51 governmental practice often did 
not require codification. Rather, executive-legislative relations in these early cases were 
regulated through informal norms and understandings. By contrast, presidentialism and written 
constitutionalism were born together with the ratification of the US constitution in 1789, a form 
adopted by the newly independent republics of Latin America.  It seems logical that this more 
engineered form of government would require the introduction of formal provisions regulating 
the interaction of the executive and the legislature earlier than would parliamentary systems.   
Table 2 about here 
When comparing executive and legislative attributes across constitutions, problems of 
comparability arise due to differences in the structure of offices.  How does one measure whether 
“the executive” has, say, veto power when executive power is divided into two offices, as in 
semi-presidential systems?  And how should we compare two systems with a different number of 
executives with respect to such powers?  One could follow one of three strategies: (1) focus on 
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only one office (e.g., head of government) and ignore the second office in dual-executive 
systems; (2) treat single-executive systems as if there were two offices, vesting the same power 
in each office, for purposes of comparing to dual-executive systems; or (3) use the executive 
branch as the unit of analysis, and assume that offices are partners (i.e., if either office in a dual 
executive system has a power, then the entire branch has such power). Each of these strategies 
introduces error, and it is not entirely obvious a priori which way to proceed.  Since our goal is to 
examine the distribution of powers across branches, and not whether these branches function in 
harmony or not, we lean towards the third approach and have assessed constitutions accordingly 
in this study.52 In a set of robustness checks summarized below, we evaluate the impact of the 
alternative measurement strategies. 
We thus analyze six elective attributes of executive-legislative relations: executive veto, 
executive decree, emergency, executive initiative of legislation, legislative oversight, and cabinet 
appointment. We describe each of these powers in turn. 
Executive veto.  Executive veto powers originate with the US constitution and are seen 
as a quintessential characteristic of presidential systems.  Yet well over half of our constitutions 
have some sort of executive approval of legislation, and many have a veto, even if it can be over-
ridden or involves only delay.  Contrary to what one would expect, not only do a significant 
number of parliamentary constitutions contain veto provisions, but in the period prior to 1945 
they were as likely to grant veto power to the executive as were presidential ones. All of the 
parliamentary constitutions with executive veto power, however, were written in the 1920s; they 
include Czechoslovakia 1920, Poland 1921, and Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania 1922. All of these 
documents allow the head of state (the monarch, the governor-general or the president chosen by 
parliament) to send a bill back for reconsideration by the legislature; often a super majority is 
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required for passage of a rejected bill; and occasionally the head of state is allowed to submit the 
matter to a public referendum if he remains unhappy with the law. 
Vetoes are also found, unsurprisingly, in semi-presidential constitutions.  The Weimar 
Constitution allowed the President to refer a bill to a plebiscite if he refused to sign it.  The 
French Constitution of 1958 had a more complex scheme, including the constitutional council as 
another veto player.  The constitutions that emerged after the fall of communism generally 
include some provision for executive veto as well.  Indeed, the content of semi-presidential 
constitutions has become very similar to that of presidential constitutions with respect to veto 
provisions.   
Thus, although they originated in a presidential constitution, veto provisions are hardly 
absent in parliamentary and semi-presidential documents.  As a matter of fact, they were 
incorporated into parliamentary constitutions in the 1920s and existed even in the first semi-
presidential constitutions.  
Executive Decree.  Executive decree power is somewhat anomalous because it precedes, 
historically at least, the existence of independent legislatures.  It can be found in monarchic (but 
not parliamentary in our sense) constitutions such as those of 1889 Meiji Japan and the 1876 
Ottoman empire, as well as in early Latin American constitutions, like those of Haiti 1805 and 
Mexico 1822. About three-fourths of the pre-1945 presidential constitutions, and two-thirds of 
the parliamentary and semi-presidential ones, contained executive decree provisions. With the 
exception of semi-presidential cases, post-1945 constitutions were less likely to contain 
executive decree provisions. Here the empirical record contradicts the widespread perception that 
recent constitutions, particularly pure presidential ones, are more likely to contain decree 
provisions.53   
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Emergency.  Emergency provisions were late to appear in parliamentary constitutions, at 
least in those that were actually implemented.  Loveman was correct that early Latin American 
countries introduced emergency provisions into their constitutions, and that this distinguished 
presidential and parliamentary constitutions in the 19th century:54 between 1800 and 1899 there 
were only two countries with parliamentary constitutions that contained emergency provisions 
(the Netherlands and Prussia); during the same time, there were ten such cases of presidential 
constitutions, nine of which hailed from Latin America (Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, El 
Salvador, Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti and, outside of the region, France in 1852). But this 
distinction between the two systems with regard to emergency provisions is no longer so 
apparent.  After a sharp decline in the appearance of new constitutions containing emergency 
provisions in presidential systems and an increase in the number of such provisions in 
parliamentary ones, the gap is smaller now and the three types of constitutions seem to evolve in 
tandem (with a period during the 1980s when the gap between presidential and parliamentary 
constitutions widened). 
The thrust of early constitutional regulation of emergency powers was to assign some 
role for the legislature in terms of oversight. A common theme was to restrict presidential 
authority to instances in which the legislature was not in session.  But today there does not really 
seem to be a correlation across government types in the assignment of powers.  In South Africa 
(1996) the legislature is the default regulator.   This is shared by presidential Estonia (that is, 
Estonia under the 1920 constitution).  In semi-presidential constitutions, the power is often 
shared between the government and the legislature, as in Slovenia’s Constitution of 1991, in 
which the legislature declares the state of emergency on the proposal of government, or the 
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Bulgarian model of 1991 in which either the president or prime minister can declare a state of 
emergency.  In short, one sees no real correlation with government type. 
Legislative initiation.  Legislative initiative has been traditionally considered the domain 
of parliamentary governments.  In order to navigate the hazards of legislative confidence, the 
executive is granted the power to introduce important bills and therefore shape the legislative 
agenda.  As a matter of fact, in many parliamentary constitutions this power goes beyond simple 
legislative initiative to include the power to force the end of legislative debates, to impose a 
yes/no vote, and to tie the outcome of a vote to the survival of the government.55   
Our data show that the conventional wisdom is incorrect, at least for the post-1945 
period. If prior to this date, governments were granted legislative initiative when they depended 
on legislative confidence in order to survive (i.e., parliamentary and semi-presidential 
constitutions), the same is not true for charters written after 1945. In recent constitutions, 
presidential systems are actually more likely than are pure parliamentary ones to allow the 
government to initiate legislation; and, when considered together (parliamentary plus semi-
presidential), constitutions under which governments depend on assembly confidence are as 
likely as presidential ones to grant the government legislative initiative. Thus, executives in 
presidential constitutions are far from being powerless when it comes to initiating legislation. 
Even since the first decades of the 20th century, presidential constitutions have on average 
contained at least one of four areas of initiative: ordinary laws, the budget, referendum and 
constitutional amendment. In some cases, such as in Chile and Brazil, the president holds the 
exclusive power to initiate the budget bill.56 
Legislative oversight.  We observe a similar phenomenon with respect to legislative 
oversight.  One would expect that provisions for legislative oversight would be weaker in 
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parliamentary constitutions due to the control the legislature already exerts over the government 
via the confidence mechanism.  For this reason, parliamentary constitutions would contain fewer 
provisions for legislative oversight, such as the requirement that the government report to the 
legislature periodically or that the legislature be allowed to investigate the government.   
The CCP survey asks whether the executive must appear in parliament at regular 
intervals, whether the parliament can interpellate the executive at will, and whether the 
legislature is empowered to investigate the executive.  We use the existence of any one of these 
provisions as constituting legislative oversight. Table 2 suggests that presidential constitutions 
tend to contain such oversight provisions more frequently than do either parliamentary or semi-
presidential constitutions (this despite of the fact that all 6 semi-presidential constitutions that 
existed prior to 1945 stipulated legislative oversight). The difference, however, is relatively 
small, particularly if we compare constitutions that require legislative confidence for the 
government to survive (parliamentary and semi-presidential) with those that do not. When we do 
so, the post-1945 difference is only 14 percentage points, suggesting that constitution-makers 
were not convinced that assembly confidence would represent a sufficient instrument of 
legislative oversight of the executive. 
Cabinet Appointment.  Another characteristic of presidential systems is the power to 
appoint the cabinet.  Indeed, our data indicate that this power is quite close to the core of the 
presidential system and is found in 92% of postwar presidential constitutions. Typically, this 
power is granted to the president’s discretion and there is little tradition of collective 
responsibility of the cabinet in presidential systems.  The power originates with the United States 
Constitution of 1789, and is evident throughout the 19th century in many Latin American 
Constitutions.  Nevertheless, executives in Parliamentary and semi-Presidential constitutions also 
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have the power, at least in the post-war era.  One might think of this power as an executive 
prerogative common to nearly all constitutions. 
We are aware that there is no universally agreed set of criteria to justify the choice of 
these six attributes of legislative-executive relations. Yet, we believe there are two main factors 
supporting our choice. First, apart from the elements that are used to define the types of 
constitution (assembly confidence and popular presidential elections), the attributes we chose are 
the ones that are most centrally discussed in the literature on executive-legislative relations.  
Second, our choice was buttressed by the fact that the six elements we selected overlap 
considerably with the attributes of presidential powers used by Shugart and Carey, Metcalf, and 
Siaroff, three of the widely employed rules for examining presidential powers.57  Shugart and 
Carey list nine legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents: five (veto, decree, legislative 
initiative, cabinet formation and cabinet dismissal) are part of our six (with cabinet formation 
and dismissal conflated into one in our case); one (assembly removal of cabinet, or censure) is a 
defining trait of the constitutional types; dissolution is something we consider in the robustness 
section; and budgetary powers are, in some sense, subsumed under legislative initiative (we are, 
at least, able to detect the cases in which the executive has no budget initiative, but cannot detect 
those in which the initiative is exclusive). Thus, the only power that they cover and we do not is 
the executive’s referendum initiative, and this is one that does not have much intuitive 
connection with regime types. Metcalf’s analysis is almost identical to Shugart and Carey’s. She 
adds “judicial review,” but this is something that we believe does not belong in a set of attributes 
of executive-legislative relations.  
Finally, Siaroff considers nine attributes: one (popular election of head of state) enters as 
a defining feature of constitutional type in our analysis; four are similar to the ones we use 
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(discretionary appointment power, central role in government formation, veto and 
emergency/decree powers); one is assembly dissolution, which we consider later; one 
(concurrent presidential and legislative elections) does not strictly belong in a list of powers; one 
is incidental to some of the powers already captured (whether the head of state chairs cabinet 
meetings); and the last (a central role in foreign policy), if properly coded, would be present in 
all constitutions since they all denote the head of state as the actor who represents the nation and 
therefore deals with representatives of other nations.   
 
C. An aggregate assessment of similarity in executive-legislative provisions 
The distribution of the constitutional attributes in Table 2 suggests that the classical 
conceptualization is something less than systemic.  In this section, we assess the degree of 
coherence in a more aggregate fashion and control for other influences on constitutional design.  
Analytically, one can approach this question with a variety of methods.  Here we develop a 
measure of the similarity between any two constitutions (in the year of their entry into force) 
based on the set of elective attributes in Table 1 and, essentially, test the predictive power of the 
classical typology.  Our measure of similarity is straightforward.  It calculates the percent of the 
binary provisions in Table 1 along which any two documents agree.  Consider, for example, the 
dyad composed by the Brazilian constitution of 1988 with the US constitution of 1787.  These 
two constitutions share three of six provisions (all but decree, emergency provisions, and the 
initiation of legislation), thus resulting in a similarity score of 0.50.  By contrast, the Brazilian 
constitution of 1891, patterned more closely after the U.S. model, shares five of six provisions 
with the U.S. document (matching on everything except decree) for a similarity score of 0.83.   
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For the 401 total constitutions for which we were able to measure government type, the 
number of bilateral comparisons is therefore 80,200 [(401*401-401)/2].  Across these dyads the 
mean similarity score is 0.68.  11,801 pairs of constitutions (about 14%) share all six provisions 
for a score of 1.00.  Fifty-six percent of these perfectly matched pairs are composed of two 
constitutions with different government types, which already suggests a fair degree of hybridity 
with respect to the elective attributes in question.  A small number of dyads (486) share none of 
the six attributes.  Of these polar opposites, roughly fifty-five percent are from the same 
“system,” again suggesting that the classical conceptualization is less than systematic .  So, for 
example, the constitutions of Burundi (1981) and Benin (1979) -- both presidential constitutions 
-- enumerate entirely different provisions with respect to these six attributes.  Same for the Czech 
Republic  (1993) and South Africa (1993), two assembly confidence constitutions whose 
“systemic” attributes do not match in any respect. 
D. Congruence of Constitutional Provisions within and across Classes 
We can begin to get a sense of the degree to which any two presidential, parliamentary, 
or semi-presidential constitutions share a distinct institutional profile by observing the mean 
similarity scores within and across categories.  Table 3 reports this set of comparisons.  If 
attributes of executive legislative relations cohere within the classical categories, then we should 
see high within-class scores and low across-class scores, relative to the overall mean.  Two of the 
three diagonal elements (presidentialism and semi-presidentialism) exhibit this pattern as does 
one of the three off-diagonal elements (semi-presidential-presidential).  This is a mixed pattern, 
to be sure.  While presidentialism and, especially semi-presidentialism, show some degree of 
within-class homogeneity, parliamentarism does not. From these data at least, it appears that the 
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classic conceptualization has, at best, only modest power to predict the package of legislative and 
executive powers.  
Table 3 about here 
The bivariate findings are intriguing and suggest at least two avenues for further inquiry.  
First, are these patterns stable over time?  Second, how does predictive ability of the system 
classification with respect to pairwise similarity (shown to be quite modest above) compare to 
that of other explanatory factors associated with differences among states or constitutions?  We 
evaluate these two questions with a set of multivariate models that regress the similarity between 
any two constitutions, a and b, on a set of shared characteristics between the two.  That is: 
yab = b0 + Xab + e 
where y is the measure of similarity between constitutions a and b, X is a vector of attributes 
describing the relationship between a and b, and e is an error term.  X includes measures of the 
following relationships between the two constitutions in a dyad: 
(1) Same region.  A dummy variable equal to one if the two constitutions are from 
countries in the same geographic region. 
(2) Same system.  A dummy variable equal to one if the two constitutions are either 
both presidential, both parliamentary, or both semi-presidential as defined by the 
variable constructed from the CCP data described above.  In some analyses, this 
variable is broken out into dummy variables representing five of the six 
combinations of pairs (with parliamentary-semi-presidential as the residual 
category).   
(3) Year difference (in 100s).  The absolute value of the difference in the year of 
promulgation between two constitutions, divided by 100. 
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(4) Same country.  A dummy variable equal to one if the two constitutions are from the 
same country, since most countries have at least two historical constitutions in our 
sample. 
 
We begin with a model run on 80,200 dyads in the sample for which we have valid data.   
Since we are concerned about the independence of observations in which individual constitutions 
are included in multiple pairings, in separate analyses we test an adapted fixed-effects model in 
which we explain variation within the first member of the dyad (by entering a dummy variable 
for each first member) and also estimate standard errors clustered within the first member of 
these dyads.  As it happens, the estimates are nearly identical to those from an OLS regression, 
which we present here. 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates for the full sample and those for two eras, pre- and 
post-World War II.  For each of these three samples we test two different specifications of the 
model.  The first specification includes a binary variable indicating whether two constitutions are 
from the same system (regardless of which) and the second set includes three binary variables 
indicating that two constitutions are both presidential, both parliamentary, or both semi-
presidential (the residual category thus includes all cross-class pairs).  The estimates from the 
full sample (Table 4, columns 1 and 4) confirm the bivariate results reported above.  The same-
system variable in column 1 suggests that within-class constitutions are indeed more similar to 
one another than are cross-class constitutions (although by only about two points, b=0.018).  The 
coefficients on the within-class variables in column 4 suggest the same mixed pattern that we 
noticed in Table 3.  While presidential and semi-presidential pairs show a modicum of similarity 
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(b = 0.045and 0.079, respectively), parliamentary systems are actually less alike (b = -0.066) 
than the cross-class dyads.   
Table 4 about here 
Table 4 provides some sense of how these patterns have changed across time.  The 
models in columns 2 and 4 restrict the cases to those in which both constitutions were written 
prior to 1945 and the models in columns 3 and 6 to those in which both were written after 1945.  
(This means, of course, that we are excluding the pairs that were written in different eras).  
Overall, it appears that modern constitutions exhibit more within-class cohesion than do pre-
WWII ones.  The coefficient on the same-system variable is strongly negative for pre-WWII 
cases (b=-0.074) and modestly positive for post-WWII cases (b=0.023).  Moreover, it appears 
that much of this reversal can be attributed to growing cohesion among presidential constitutions.  
The effects in models 5 and 6 suggest that, although parliamentary constitutions have become 
more homogeneous in the post-war period, they are still quite dissimilar: when it comes to 
executive-legislative properties, two modern parliamentary constitutions are still more dissimilar 
than two constitutions belonging to two different types. 
It is important to note that our analysis involves constitutional documents, regardless of 
their degree of enforcement.  Parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-parliamentarism, 
however, are labels often applied to democratic forms of government and it is natural to wonder 
if the same results would be obtained if we restricted our analysis to documents that govern 
democratic regimes.  
Of course, identifying the “democratic” documents is not as straightforward as it may 
appear.  Our solution consisted of using the Cheibub (2007) database to identify forms of 
democratic government, and match the CCP constitutional documents to them. This procedure, 
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however, generated a dataset with significant differences with respect to the data analyzed in the 
body of the paper. For example, some constitutions found in the “democratic” sample  were 
excluded from our analysis because they neither had an assembly confidence proviso nor called 
for popular presidential elections. The reason for this is that, although the constitution had been 
written prior to the period covered by the Cheibub dataset, it was in force in systems that were 
democratic after 1945. Examples include Belgium 1831, Canada 1867, Colombia 1886, Cuba 
1940, Luxembourg 1868, Netherlands 1848, Sweden 1809, Switzerland 1899, and Norway 1814. 
Moreover, the sample gets considerably reduced when we adopt this procedure. For the pre-1945 
period, there are 55 dyads available for comparison (as opposed to 5,778 using only the CCP 
data); for the post-1945 period, there are 3,916 dyads in the sample (down from 42,778 when 
only the CCP data are used).  
 Table 5, columns 1 and 2, reports the findings for a set of constitutions governing 
democratic regimes in the post-1945 period, whether or not they have been written under these 
regimes. Qualitatively, the results are the same as reported before: two constitutions that regulate 
the same type of democracy are more likely to be similar when it comes to executive-legislative 
relations than two constitutions that regulate different types of democracy. However,  regime 
type is not the biggest influence on the constitutional configuration.  Other factors include the era 
and region in which the constitution was written, and, most importantly, the country: as before, 
the best predictors of how a constitution regulates executive-legislative relations are the other 
constitutions written in that same country. As before, we also find that constitutions of two 
presidential and semi-presidential democracies are more likely to be similar than those of 
democratic pairs with different systems; and that constitutions in parliamentary democracies are 
less likely to be similar than those of disparate pairs. The magnitude of similarity of pairs of 
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presidential and semi-presidential democracies is considerably higher: 0.142 (as opposed to 
0.045) for presidentialism and 0.180 (as opposed to 0.079) for semi-presidentialism. This, 
however, should not be read as an indication that presidential and semi-presidential democratic 
regimes are becoming more “consistent” in matching their constitutions with ancillary provisions 
for executive-legislative relations. Columns 3 and 4 of table 5 show that coefficients do not 
increase for dyads of presidential and semi-presidential constitutions written in the democracies 
that emerged since 1974; and columns 5 and 6 show that, in fact, the effect of system similarity 
virtually disappears, and presidential dyads become more dissimilar, in those constitutions 
written after the fall of Communism.  
Table 5 about here 
To summarize, we draw two key insights from these findings.  First, overall, the classical 
conceptualization scheme exhibits relatively little institutional cohesion.  To some degree, this 
overall effect masks some internal homogeneity within the presidential and semi-presidential 
classes.  Second, this lack of cohesion appears to have declined over time among presidential 
constitutions but increased among parliamentary ones.  This latter finding is somewhat surprising 
given that, according to conventional wisdom, early parliamentary constitutions rarely codified 
their legislative-executive relations.  The postwar parliamentary constitutions, it seems, have 
evolved away from classical models. 
It is revealing to compare the institutional similarity predicted by the classic typology 
with other non-institutional predictors.  As Table 4 shows, the other characteristics of pairs in the 
model (same region, same country, and same era) all had effects in the direction we would 
expect: pairs of constitutions written in the same era, the same country, and in the same 
geographic area tend to be more similar than those that were written in different eras, countries, 
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or geographic regions. Moreover, all of these effects are, in terms of magnitude, stronger than the 
effect of government type, at least the aggregate measure that we utilize.  So, based on model 1 
of Table 4, we estimate that, on average, constitutions from the same region are 3 percentage 
points more similar, those from the same country 10 points more similar, and those separated by 
100 years are 3 points less similar.  Knowing the century or the region in which the constitutions 
were written allows one to predict the similarity of their institutional attributes better than one 
could by knowing only that they are of the same system type.  This is our principal and, we 
believe, somewhat unsettling finding for those of us who have come to rely upon – and teach – 
the classical conceptualization of regime types. 
E. Robustness 
Are these findings robust to alternative methods?  For the most part they are, although 
some alternative methods and some conditions yield increased predictive power for the classical 
conceptualization.  Consider first our measure of the dependent variable.  In its construction we 
faced a decision about how to treat the comparison of systems with different numbers of 
executives.  Given the choice of comparing only the head of government across systems, 
comparing across two offices by creating twin powers in single-executive systems, or collapsing 
dual executive systems to one by aggregating the powers of the two offices, we chose the last.  
The first alternative has the disadvantage of ignoring an entire office and the second alternative 
introduces a degree of similarity across systems based purely on a structural attribute (the 
number of executives) that is perfectly correlated with the classical classification, thus artificially 
inflating the correlation between the system classification and institutional similarity.  
Nevertheless, we tested our models with dependent variables constructed with these alternative 
methods.  The results suggest stronger effects for the system variable (the coefficient on the same 
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system variable for models equivalent to Model 1 in table 4 is b=0.08 and b=0.09 for the two 
alternative methods, respectively).  These estimates would suggest significantly stronger 
predictive power for the classic categorization, though clearly some of that power is an artifact of 
measurement strategies correlated with the dependent variable. 
We also wondered how well the classic conceptualization would predict an expanded set 
of features of executive-legislative relations.  Recall that, in the CCP, we have at our disposal a 
fairly comprehensive dataset on the powers of and constraints on executives and legislatures.  
We therefore developed a measure of similarity based on the six attributes plus an expanded set 
of features by including provisions regarding the executive’s power to propose budgets, 
executive immunity, legislative immunity, executive power to propose amendments, executive 
power to pardon, and a bicameral legislature.  Models run on this expanded similarity measure 
returned estimates for the same-system coefficient that were, if anything, smaller than that based 
on the original six features (e.g., b=.015 for the model equivalent to column 1).  In some ways, 
this finding is not surprising since the items in this expanded set are not necessarily ones that are 
suspected of being elective attributes of presidentialism and parliamentarism.  Nonetheless, the 
expanded items are core attributes of executives and legislatures, with important effects on the 
relationship between the two branches, and it is noteworthy that they too are unrelated to the 
classical distinction.    
Finally, since we found that six allegedly elective attributes were unrelated to 
presidentialism and parliamentarism, we were led to investigate the relationship between the 
classification and provisions for assembly dissolution, a feature that is so well associated with 
parliamentarism that some even include it as part of the concept’s definition.58  Yet, even with 
respect to this quasi-definitional feature we found heterogeneity across class.  Since 1789, a not 
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unsubstantial percentage of the 204 presidential constitutions in our sample (22%) have included 
assembly dissolution while a considerable minority of parliamentary constitutions (20%) does 
not do so.  Certainly, this sort of distribution across classes suggests that the feature is indeed 
more common to parliamentary systems, but the feature seems hardly definitional.  That it is not 
exclusive to, and universal among, parliamentary systems only emphasizes the hybridity within 
the classical categories.  Curiously, a full 87% of semi-presidential constitutions provide for 
assembly dissolution, a level that is consistent with our prior finding of relative homogeneity in 
the semi-presidential class.  Again, we note the irony that the intermediate category exhibits the 
lowest level of hybridity. We were also curious about the robustness of our findings across 
alternative measures of the classical categorization.  Recall that of the four extant measures of 
the concept that we assembled, we found a decided lack of convergence.  Indeed, on average, 
any two of these measures agreed with one another in only 60% of cases.  Accordingly, we 
tested the predictive power of each of these variables.  Not surprisingly, the Cheibub 
classification, which is highly correlated with our measure (and, on average, most highly 
correlated with the other measures) returned results very similar to ours: we estimated a 
coefficient of b=.05 for the same system variable across the 4,095 dyads covered.  This effect is 
larger than the one we estimated with the CCP measure, and is comparable in size to the effect of 
region but not era, whose effect (b=.21) is much larger in that model.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is worth reminding ourselves what is at stake in the choice of analytical concepts to 
understand executive-legislative relations.  As Moe and Caldwell (1994: 171) note, with little 
exaggeration:  
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Consider the issue that has doubtless been the most enduring focus of institutional 
attention since democracy first became prevalent among western nations: is a 
separation of powers system or a parliamentary system somehow better?  It is hard 
to get more basic than this.  Historically, these are far-and-away the most common 
forms democracies have assumed, and they are the usual starting points when 
designers begin thinking about what kind of democracy they want to build for 
themselves.  
No one should doubt that the idea that the origin and survival of executives represents an 
important constitutional distinction.  But it seems possible that this distinction has preoccupied 
scholars and constitution-makers at the expense of other important dimensions of executive-
legislative relations – dimensions that may be orthogonal to the classic distinction.  This paper 
has examined formal constitutional provisions of presidential, parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems in order to assess the internal cohesion of these classic categories.  We 
recognize that formal constitutions provide only partial guidance in understanding the allocation 
of powers within all types of systems.59  Nevertheless, formal provisions are central to most 
definitions under consideration and do capture the intentions of constitutional designers as far as 
governmental structure.60 
Our analysis suggests a surprising collection of findings and, by implication, pronounced 
skepticism regarding the classical typology of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism.  Many countries, it seems, are veritable hybrids, showing absolutely no 
resemblance to the classic types across a long list of constitutional provisions concerning the 
power of executives and legislatures.  But our skepticism is differentiated: the three classical 
types differ in their internal cohesion.  Ironically, semi-presidential constitutions – a class 
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defined by its hybrid nature -- constitute the only class of constitutions that exhibit anything 
approaching internal coherence.  In general, however, the predictive capacity of the classical 
concept is underwhelming.  Indeed, as we note, in order to predict a constitution’s content, one 
would do better to know the region or the century in which the constitution was written than to 
know whether it was presidential or parliamentary. 
In terms of guidance regarding the continued use of the classical taxonomy, we conclude 
with some provisional alternative directions for both usage and further research.  First, it seems 
clear to us that scholars need to be aware of the limited purchase of the classical taxonomy.  To 
scholars for whom “parliamentarism,” simply means “assembly confidence” (a label that is 
specific about the defining attribute) our findings will not give pause.  To the many other 
scholars for whom “parliamentarism” connotes elective attributes other than “assembly 
confidence,” our findings should invite a shift in consciousness and vocabulary.  Specifically, it 
may be worth adopting the more concrete labels “assembly confidence executive” and “directly-
elected executive” over “presidential” and “parliamentary,” respectively.  The former labels have 
the virtue of connoting the definitional properties clearly without furthering stereotypes.  Such an 
approach also has the virtue of overcoming confusion resulting from the fact that the nominal 
category of “presidents” includes both figureheads in assembly confidence republics and directly 
elected heads of government.   
Of course, even more descriptive labels are only useful if there is a particular theoretical 
purpose for focusing on the definitional attribute in question.  As we argued at the outset, 
scholars use the core categorization of government type to explain a wide variety of political and 
economic outcomes. Many of these outcomes do not involve the stipulation of a causal 
mechanism that depends on assembly confidence.  We ought to then encourage more precise 
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categorizations based on particular attributes of legislative-executive relations that are believed 
to contribute to the outcome of interest.  So, for example, if it is the executive’s prerogative to 
propose legislation that promotes government efficiency, scholars should analyze that feature 
specifically and not implicate the broader concept of parliamentarism, which is tangential at best 
to the legislative process.  
One important caveat concerns measurement error.  As we hope to have made clear, the 
assessment of institutional similarity involves a set of measurement decisions, including the 
selection of “elective” properties, the computation of a similarity measure, the choice of an 
appropriate measure of the classical categories, and the development of an appropriate method to 
compare two-headed and one-headed executives.  Our findings seem to hold across a host of 
different methodological approaches, but all of our measurement choices should be revisited and 
tested empirically.     
Finally, as suggested above, it seems advisable to seriously consider alternative 
conceptualizations of executive-legislative relations.  Arraying cases along dimensions such as 
executive or legislative “independence” and “power” are obvious alternatives to the classic 
types.61  So too are well-known concepts such as Lijphart’s consensual-majoritarianism and 
Tsebelis’ veto-players.62  Each of these concepts is related to the classical typology but each also 
identifies an important theoretical dimension that cuts across the classic distinction.  One might 
also focus on partially aggregated measures of executive power such as executive power over 
lawmaking,63 which would encompass veto provisions, legislative initiative, and executive 
decree power.  However, it could be that other, more incisive ways of slicing cases will occur to 
the astute scholar.  Undoubtedly, some such typologies already exist.  Indeed, with respect to 
semi-presidentialism, some of this re-categorization is noticeably under way.  Elgie hints at this 
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in expressing the view that we should not be focusing on normative issues about the classic 
distinction, but rather on those of more discrete subtypes.64  We view all of these efforts as 
important contributions to an understanding of executive-legislative relations that are at least as 
important to the dominant classification based on assembly confidence, which is just not as 
systemic as many believe it to be. 
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Table 1 
Presumed Attributes of Executive-Legislative Systems 
 
 Systems 
 Presidential Parliamentary Semi-Presidential 
Defining Attributes    
Assembly Confidence No Yes For head of government 
Popularly Elected Head 
of State 
Yes No Yes 
Elective Attributes    
Executive decree No Yes Depends 
Emergency powers Strong Weak Strong 
Initiation of legislation Legislature Executive Depends 
Legislative oversight Yes No Depends 
Executive veto Yes No Depends 
Cabinet appointment Executive Legislature Depends 
Other Attributes    
Assembly Dissolution* No Yes Depends 
*Assembly dissolution is considered by some to be a defining attribute. Our principal analysis does not treat this 
feature as such, although we do so in some robustness tests 
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Table 2 
Percent of Constitutions with Selected Provisions, by De Jure Government-type and Era 
 
 1789-1945 1946-2006 
 Presidential Parliamentary Semi-
presidential 
Total Presidential Parliamentary Semi-
presidential 
Total 
Executive has veto power 80 80 100 81 87 63 82 77 
Executive has decree power 73 67 71 72 66 48 72 61 
Executive has emergency 
powers 
87 73 71 84 95 86 97 92 
Executive initiates legislation 58 80 86 63 72 54 89 70 
Legislature has oversight 
powers 
87 80 86 86 84 49 76 70 
Executive appoints cabinet 93 87 86 92 92 95 96 94 
Number of constitutions 86 15 7 108 117 104 72 293 
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Table 3 
Similarity of Constitutional Dyads within and across Categories of Government type 
 
 Constitution B 
 Parliamentary Presidential Semi-presidential 
Constitution A    
Parliamentary 0.61 
(7,021) 
  
Presidential 0.64 
(24,157) 
0.72 
(20,503) 
 
Semi-presidential 0.65 
(9,401) 
0.73 
(16,037) 
0.76 
(3,081) 
Overall mean 0.68 
(80,200) 
  
(Standard deviation) 0.22   
* Significantly different from the overall mean at 5%; number of dyads in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Explaining the Similarity of Executive-Legislative Elective Properties, by era (OLS) 
 
 
Data: Dyads composed of national constitutions promulgated between 1789 and 2006 
 
 (1) 
1789-2006 
(2) 
Pre-1945 
(3) 
Post-1944 
(4) 
1789-2006 
(5) 
Pre-1945 
(6) 
Post-1944 
Same country 0.103** 
(0.007) 
0.118** 
(0.013) 
0.126** 
(0.013) 
0.100** 
(0.007) 
0.118** 
(0.013) 
0.130** 
(0.013) 
Difference in 
birth year 
(100’s) 
-0.029** 
(0.002) 
-0.113** 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.039** 
(0.002) 
-0.114** 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Same region 0.032** 
(0.002) 
0.119** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.003) 
0.019** 
(0.002) 
0.117** 
(0.008) 
0.011** 
(0.003) 
Same system 0.020** 
(0.002) 
-0.074** 
(0.008) 
0.023** 
(0.002) 
   
Both 
presidential 
   0.045** 
(0.002) 
-0.071** 
(0.009) 
0.060** 
(0.003) 
Both semi-
presidential 
   0.079** 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.047) 
0.095** 
(0.004) 
Both 
parliamentary 
   -0.066** 
(0.003) 
-0.101** 
(0.022) 
-0.056** 
(0.003) 
Constant 0.676** 
(0.001) 
0.715** 
(0.006) 
0.663** 
(0.002) 
0.683** 
(0.001) 
0.716** 
(0.006) 
0.665** 
(0.002) 
Observations 80,200 5,778 42,778 80,200 5,778 42,778 
R-squared 0.015 0.092 0.008 0.034 0.092 0.036 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Explaining the Similarity of Executive-Legislative Elective Properties in Democratic Regimes, by 
era (OLS) 
 
 
Data: Dyads composed of national constitutions in democracies between 1946 and 2006 
 
 (1) 
1946-2006 
(2) 
1946-2006 
(3) 
1974-2006 
(4) 
1974-2006 
(5) 
Post-1989 
(6) 
Post-1989 
Same country 0.161** 
(0.044) 
0.115** 
(0.008) 
0.141* 
(0.061) 
0.086 
(0.061) 
0.075 
(0.061) 
0.125* 
(0.061) 
Difference in 
birth year 
(100’s) 
-0.193** 
(0.024) 
-0.188** 
(0.024) 
-0.982** 
(0.069) 
-0.909** 
(0.068) 
0.486* 
(0.214) 
0.571** 
(0.212) 
Same region 0.036** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
Same system 0.039** 
(0.007) 
 0.047** 
(0.010) 
 0.024 
(0.013) 
 
Both 
presidential 
 0.142** 
(0.012) 
 0.113** 
(0.016) 
 -0.040 
(0.021) 
Both semi-
presidential 
 0.180** 
(0.016) 
 0.141** 
(0.016) 
 0.062** 
(0.015) 
Both 
parliamentary 
 -0.029** 
(0.008) 
 -0.049** 
(0.013) 
 -0.070* 
(0.034) 
Constant 0.693** 
(0.007) 
0.696** 
(0.007) 
0.781** 
(0.010) 
0.775** 
(0.009) 
0.785** 
(0.012) 
0.782** 
(0.012) 
Observations 3,916 3,916 1,830 1,830 666 666 
R-squared 0.039 0.098 0.135 0.187 0.017 0.057 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5% 
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